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Bernard Juillerat’s argument about the way, in inter-
pretations of Melanesian material, the gift has often
been tied to reciprocity embeds the gift in a psychoana-
lytically informed universe. The power of his argument is
acknowledged. Stepping outside such a universe, this
article accords a different kind of power to his observa-
tions. It shows how they prompt some anthropologically
interesting questions about practices of organ and tissue
donation in North America. For where Juillerat would
detach the gift from reciprocity, some of those engaged
in debates over the ethics of donation would like to see
reciprocity attached to the gift. What Euro-American
paradigm underlies these arguments?
Keywords: Gift exchange, Yafar of Papua New Gui-
nea, blood donation, gamete donation, mothers,
altruism
RÉSUMÉ
Dans son argument sur la façon dont les interpréta-
tions des matériaux ethnographiques mélanésiens lient
souvent le don à la réciprocité, Bernard Juillerat intègre
le don à un univers marqué par la psychanalyse. La force
de son argument a été reconnue. Se situant en dehors
d’un tel univers, l’article accorde aux observations de cet
auteur une force d’un autre type. Il montre comment ces
observations soulèvent d’intéressantes questions anthro-
pologiques pour aborder les pratiques de don d’organes
et de tissus en Amérique du nord. Car là où Juillerat
dissocierait le don de la réciprocité, certains des spécia-
listes engagés dans les débats sur l’éthique de ces dons
aimeraient y voir associée de la réciprocité. Par quel
paradigme propre à l’Euro-Amérique ces arguments
sont-ils sous-tendus ?
Mots-clés : échange de dons, Yafar de Papouasie
Nouvelle-Guinée, don de sang, don de gamètes,
mères, altruisme
In a co-edited volume put together to promote
mutual understanding between Francophone
and Anglophone anthropologists (Jeudy-Ballini
and Juillerat, 2002), Bernard Juillerat threw
down a challenge to what had become ortho-
doxy in much (not all) of the English-language
literature on Melanesia. It is of course a nice
point that the orthodoxy had a lineage of French
origin, in the work of Marcel Mauss. I refer to
Juillerat’s revisiting of the concept of the gift, or
rather of the place the gift has held in the anthro-
pological paradigm of social exchange. Antici-
pated in the Introduction to the volume, and
followed through by other contributors, his own
chapter (written initially in 1996) has an unequi-
vocal title:
«The other side of the gift: from desire to taboo.
Representations of exchange and oedipal symbolism
among the Yafar, Papua New Guinea.»
I take up the challenge in order neither to
criticize nor concur with Juillerat’s model. He
offers us a coherent and persuasive account in
his interpretation of Yafar, and I do not propose
to disturb it. Yet from today’s vantage point it
strikes a chord of a kind that he might not have
foreseen. In acknowledgement of his contribu-
tion to anthropology at large, my informal and
* Girton College, University of Cambridge, ms10026@cam.ac.uk
Journal de la Société des Océanistes, 130-131, année 2010
speculative comments offer a brief footnote on
paradigms.
Two exhortations
Juillerat is not the first Melanesianist, and
surely will not be the last, to have taken issue
with prevailing assumptions about the recipro-
city being signalled in the gift. It is the way he
does it, and the forcefulness of his demonstra-
tion, that is striking. First he is unequivocal
about confronting Mauss, he and his co-editor
declaring that their account is «opposed to what
Mauss wrote about the obligations that structure
the logic of exchange» (Jeudy-Ballini and Juille-
rat, 2002: 11). Second, he wishes to retain the
concept of «gift» while disentangling it from
«reciprocity» and, to the extent that it is entailed,
«exchange». Indeed one could argue that the
effect is to give the gift new life, keeping the scope
of Mauss’s general endeavour by showing how it
may be newly thought across a range of situa-
tions. It is specifically Mauss’s original emphasis
on «obligation» in the formulation of reciprocity
as the motor for exchange that is the problem.
«Melanesian ethnography shows that (the inten-
tion of) giving does not necessarily entail the obliga-
tion of receiving or reciprocating.» (2002: 11, original
brackets)
In its place he puts desire and its psychic
consequences. He nonetheless continues to use
the vocabulary of gift exchange, in effect divi-
ding gifts into those that are reciprocated and
those that are not. To allow theoretical room for
the latter, he concludes the chapter saying,
«we should pursue the unshackling of gift-giving
from exchange, to which Lévi-Strauss’ theory bound
it.» (Juillerat, 2002: 183)
It is in effect an exhortation: Detach recipro-
city from the gift!
There are all kinds of reasons for being inte-
rested in Juillerat’s proposition. I am not just
thinking of the very considerable and still lively
debates in anthropology to which it contributes,
and which regrettably have to be ignored here,
but how it might sit with perspectives from
elsewhere1. I am particularly struck by having
recently come across a counter-exhortation: Tie
reciprocity to the gift!
This is a plea that comes from the other side of
the world, nothing to do with the kinds of mate-
rials on which Juillerat bases his account. But it
does come from the same Euro-American world
(if I can subsume both French-speaking and
English-speaking orientations that way) that
gives us the concept of the gift in the first place.
There is a more ideationally specific lineage here,
for a powerful voice in two areas of that world
has been Titmuss’s The Gift Relationship (1997);
in that book the author prefaced a typology of
blood donors with a consideration of Mauss and
Lévi-Strauss. Comparing the UK and the US,
Titmuss offered a sociological disquisition on
policy for blood donation programmes. Indeed,
since it first appeared in 1970, his book has been
a major influence on the extent to which the gift
has been embraced as model for such donations;
above all the work is evoked for tying the gift to
what we could call a Euro-American substitu-
tion of, if not negation of, reciprocity,
« altruism ». Through the words of one com-
mentary on Titmuss’s argument, the gift of
blood in the modern welfare state is construed
as:
«voluntary, not compulsory, and the recipient is
under no personal pressure to reciprocate. It is given
not because the giver expects a return, but as an act of
voluntary altruism and social duty.» (Waldby and
Mitchell, 2006: 15)
In the UK, the altruistic impetus has been
explicitly upheld through policy measures that
detach commercial transactions in blood and
blood products from the primary act of volun-
tary donation2. Moreover, the altruistic gifting
of blood has become the model for other dona-
tion schemes that have been developed since ¢ for
organ and tissue transplants of all kinds, and
for gametes and embryos. In the US, where
payments have long been acceptable for blood
products and gametes, organ and tissue dona-
tions by contrast are required to be altruistic.
«Altruism» emerges as the appropriate ethical
stance for donors of body parts, and in this arena
an overarching moral entity, «society»3 can be a
beneficiary. However, this may be an era that has
exhausted itself.
1. In the context of diverse contrasts that have been posited between Melanesia and Amazonia, especially those that turn on
the presence and absence of exchange relations, Juillerat’s material on the hunting and gardening Yafar might be very germane.
As Juillerat notes in his chapter, the Yafar life-cycle is conspicuously devoid of the kinds of overt exchange relations one finds
across many parts of Melanesia, let alone ceremonial or agonistic exchange.
2. American openness to the morality of commerce is evident in the extent to which in the US for-profit commercial plasma
companies supplement blood collecting by not-for-profit hospitals.
3. As the welfare state (Titmuss), the nation (see the contributions to Copeman, 2009), or the future of international research
(Waldby and Mitchell, 2006). Strathern (1992) offers a commentary from the late 1980s.
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Two studies (Goodwin, 2006; Waldby and
Mitchell, 2006) on tissue and organ circulation
(transplantation, procurement), drawing mainly
from materials on the US but also from the UK,
explicitly question the future of Titmuss’s gift
relationship. If until now conventions about the
donation of body parts as altruistic «gifts of life»
have held the moral high ground in the advance-
ment of transplantation practices and in the pro-
tocols of procurement agencies, they argue that
the model of a gift free of proper compensation
may have run its course. Too many counter-
examples have built up, that is, examples of prac-
tices where «the gift form» simply «cannot func-
tion as a rejoinder or clear alternative to the
incursion of market values into human tissue
economies» (Waldby and Mitchell, 2006: 182).
The way that most body tissue circulates in, to
use a contrast first deployed in blood collection,
«fractionated» rather than «whole» units; the
uncertainty of donating for unknown research
use; underground markets and the international
traffic in organs, not to speak of the financial
profit derived from procurement schemes, all in
this view demand some re-thinking of the act of
donation. It is in this context that Goodwin spe-
cifically advocates compensation for the families
of deceased organ donors; the aim is to increase
the overall supply4 and check the abuses of the
black market. This is not in order to create a
commodity market in body parts. On the
contrary, and the point is anticipated by Radin
(1996), it is argued that such payment need not
detract from the idea of a gift in terms of benefit
to others. When the gift is tied to exchange like
this, and benefit is regarded as returning to the
donor’s family, the anthropologist might say that
the gift is reciprocated. Whether the exchange is
or is not market exchange is a separate issue.
Goodwin (2006) does not advocate direct
compensation to living donors, and is concerned
to keep the notion of altruism alive. I later turn
to a proposition from Thompson (2007) about
live donation, in which she recommends pay-
ment where it is not currently made, who goes on
to sidestep the question of altruism by putting in
its place the ethical principle of care (2010). The
aim is a better procurement system, but also
justice to the donor, and ¢ although this phrase is
not used ¢ a form of direct reciprocity. I should
briefly note that neither is an anthropologist (nor
are Waldby and Mitchell whom I also cite), and
while Goodwin refers to the gift in her criticism
of Titmuss, and Thompson mentions gift theory,
the terms reciprocity and gift exchange do not
form their working vocabulary5. (One finds ins-
tead giving, donation, altruism, compensation.)
The justification for my translating their argu-
ments into anthropological idiom will I hope
become evident. In the meanwhile, I remain with
a general observation about the exhaustion of
ideas.
It is not a model of donation as such that is
exhausted. Rather, in these Euro-American nar-
ratives the gift (e.g. altruistic donations in the
vernacular) is invariably opposed to the commo-
dity, and what seems to have exhausted itself is
the utility of that distinction. The argument put
forward in respect of organ and tissue donation
proposes that payment received for donation
could be thought of as a «hybrid» combination
of incentives. The point is not to jettison the idea
of gift giving but to tie such giving to the kinds of
transactions it was once thought to deny. Among
other things, payment would signal a compul-
sion to reflect something of the transactional
and medical complexity (of extraction) that defi-
nes the gift’s career in this field. It seems to me
that there is an interesting question here for
present-day anthropology. Juillerat’s position
was that Mauss’s stress on reciprocity is analyti-
cally exhausted in the sense that too many
counter-examples have built up of areas of
Melanesian life where gifts appear to be given
without reciprocity. Do the two exhortations to
which these approaches lead come from the same
paradigm? If so, are we witnessing a paradigm
made evident in its passing? If not so, then are
the models used by Juillerat (and other Euro-
American Melanesianists) and by the Euro-
American commentators with respect to certain
of their own practices (donations of body mate-
rial) at all comparable?
The question about paradigms only makes
sense as a question about whether, at the
moment the notion of gift-giving is detached
from or tied to exchange and reciprocity, we
could argue that there is similar intellectual work
going on. Let us look, then, at specific moments
of detachment and attachment.
Two mothers: Yafar
The figure of the mother plays a central part in
Juillerat’s account, and two kinds appear in his
4. In dealing with the failure of the altruistic system in the US to ensure sufficient supply of much needed organs, she
(Goodwin, 2006: 10) points to the avoidably high death rate for patients on waiting lists, especially among African Americans.
5. By contrast, the anthropologist Sharp (2006) has both «gift economy» and «reciprocity» in the index of her book on organ
transplants in the US.
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chapter. The primordial Mother, who gives no
less than the world, has as her shadow the
(human) mothers of children with their nurtu-
ring gifts of milk ¢ the «mother’s selfless gift to
her child», as the joint Introduction puts it
(Jeudy-Ballini and Juillerat, 2001: 11). The
mother-child relation of everyday interaction is
ritually reactivated, we are told, when men
beseech the maternal totem, the coconut palm in
flower, to shed its abundance upon them. The
flowers that fall are (likened to) milk, in turn an
index of abundant game. The men of the two
moieties reactivating the primordial Mother’s
fecundity render her as a counterpart to the
paternal sago palm, which in the course of the
same rite is cut and consumed. The inflorescence
from the coconut, not normally eaten, is tasted
and then given to hunting dogs who will
demonstrate what the Mother provides. At the
end of the hunting period, the bestowal com-
plete, the flowering part is closed up.
The violence done to his account by my abs-
tracting Juillerat’s analysis from its psychoana-
lytic framing, and the psychic resonance that gift
carries in this context, must be acknowledged.
His whole point is the inadequacy of the kinds of
explanations to which Mauss’s social and (in the
emphasis on the obligations to receive and reci-
procate) juridical approach are addressed. I
might add that is also a violence not to do justice
to the incomparable order of detail that he pro-
vides, here and across his work. My interest is in
the tenacity of the gift as a concept. What seems
to conserve his own vocabulary of gifting in
relation to the primordial Mother is the assump-
tion that ordinary human mothers are «giving
gifts» when they feed their children6. These
mothers later eat of the pork that their brothers
will have received as explicit payment for mater-
nal milk; the meat comes from their sons’ / sis-
ter’s sons’ hunting (Juillerat, 2002: 175-6). We
could regard the brother-sister pair as the actor
here, mother’s brother as Yafar say being «the
breast»; but Juillerat sees this as a redirection
from the woman to her brother from whose hand
she receives the pork, keeping the image of the
mother as one who does not receive directly7.
The primordial Mother, on the other hand, while
having a male counterpart in the paternal totem
or «divine Father» seems, in this particular
account, to have no such brother. However, her
single breast, originally severed from the rest of
her when parts of her body formed the world,
was hung by the Father in the sky as the sun
(Juillerat, 1992).
Juillerat (2002) focuses on the unreciprocated
nature of the Yafar Mother’s gift. It is a gift
insofar as, following the vernacular pleading
with an explicit reference to milk, the cry is for
the Mother to «give» game to be hunted. Ani-
mals are itemized ¢ pigs, cassowaries, possum ¢
and she is asked to give them all. The gift is
unreciprocated, in Juillerat’s view, insofar as it is
totalizing: giving everything to people, she is not
able to receive anything herself (2002: 165-6).
There is, he asserts, no possibility of exchange.
At the moment of detachment, when the coco-
nut inflorescence is shaken over them, the men
are mute recipients, indeed their eyes are averted,
neither seeing nor being seen. The anxiety is that
they will not receive anything, that they will not
have achieved (in Juillerat’s words) their desire
for the mother’s desire. The contrast is with their
later being seen by the spirits, for whom they
have left gifts, who make them gifts of game and
their own active seeing of the animals they are
going to shoot («scopic capture», 2002: 170-
171). Game is ultimately the Mother’s gift, but
return is made only to the more immediate spi-
rits who enable hunters to see their prey. Given
the sheer inappropriateness of the source of
bounty desiring anything back, the Mother’s
own gift is detached from exchange. Yafar say
that the whole world comes from the Mother’s
body.
What goes for the maternal gift of milk (game)
from the totemic Mother goes too for the pater-
nal sago from the totemic Father.
«From the standpoint of the gift, both substances
are received and consumed [in the course of ritual]
without compensation. Humans do not give the divine
couple anything.» (2002: 164)
But the Father has other roles to play. Juillerat
particularly deploys the figure of the Mother to
make his general point about exchange; it is in
the context of her bountiful and uncompensated
bestowal that reciprocity seems beside the point.
Even when reciprocity does appear so attached
in (human) exchanges, Yafar prefer to get it over
with as soon as possible: to put off reciprocating
is, Juillerat says, regarded as a bad custom.
Elsewhere in Papua New Guinea people may
cultivate debts, and the anthropologist turns
6. One could as well analyse this from the perspective of unmediated relations, as can hold between mother and child; it
would give us the idea of an exchange (in the impact of persons upon one another) without a gift. Apropos the emphasis on the
mother, Juillerat describes how the reactivation of the primordial paternal semen is similarly «unreciprocated» (e.g. 2002: 164).
7. Jeudy-Ballini, who refers to the self-less nurture that comes from «the mother», nonetheless points to the «deferred,
long-term reciprocity» to which human mothers look forward (Jeudi-Ballini and Juillerat 2002: 11, n.4).
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reciprocity into a structuring feature of social
life, but here people hate to think of themselves
as in debt. Juillerat seemingly detaches recipro-
city from the gift at the moment when he
nonetheless wishes to conserve Yafar men’s
desire for the Mother’s abundance as at once an
example of gift-giving and as an organizing fea-
ture of ritual action.
Two mothers: North America
In almost every respect it would seem alien to
suggest a comparison with those caught up in
the configurations of organ, blood ¢ and other
tissue ¢ and gamete donations in North Ame-
rica. Here men and women contribute to sche-
mes that circulate body parts between persons,
and these days, when whole blood is normally
broken down or fractionated into separable pro-
ducts and whole organ transfer is only a part of a
much wider traffic in body tissue, it may be dif-
ficult to visualize a donor-recipient relationship.
However, such an imagined relationship has
been understood as lying at the core of the impe-
tus to donate. That does not mean that the par-
ties should be identifiable, and the protection of
donor anonymity has often meant keeping
donor and eventual recipient(s) apart (stre-
nuously defended in the case of organ transplant
professionals, sometimes against people’s own
desires [Sharp, 2006]). Yet the person from
whom the body part comes, whether alive or
dead, continues to be called a «donor». The
same term is used of course in Euro-American
practices of giving to charity or otherwise in
support of good causes, a depersonalized giving
that nonetheless requires envisaging some kind
of human recipient at the end of a chain of
transactions. Imagining the absent recipient, or
donor for that matter, plays a special part in
gamete and specifically ova donation, as Konrad
(2005) has described in the UK. In the US, reci-
pients of organs may try to imagine their donors,
and it has been reported that mothers of children
who donated after an early death may seek out
the person whose body now contains a living
part of their child (Sharp, 2006: 196).
Now Goodwin (2006: 18) is not the first com-
mentator, and certainly will not be the last, to
observe that:
«human donations enter [the organ procurement
and distribution system] altruistically and exit com-
mercially.»
The engineering of tissues means that:
«any donated tissue may be put to multiple uses and
adopt multiple trajectories [including as items for
trade]. [...] Tissue donation is thus transformed from
an act of direct civic responsibility [...] into a complex
network of donor-recipient relations heavily mediated
by biotechnical processes and an institutional complex
of tissue banks, pharmaceutical and research compa-
nies, and clinics.» (Waldby and Mitchell, 2006: 22)
all of which need to fund their services. If one
adds to this the pressure of ever-present shor-
tage, and the international black markets that
spring up to meet demand from wealthy coun-
tries, there is a case for change to donation prac-
tices. Goodwin (2006: 21) proposes introducing
remuneration to the relatives of deceased organ
donors, in order to create a more open and equi-
table system; it would embrace «a transparent
but limited market approach». Commodifica-
tion with respect to organs is outlawed in the US.
Yet there is a precedent of sorts, she notes, that
shows «Americans’ willingness to utilize mar-
kets to procure and allocate human resources»
(2006: 21). She refers here to reproductive
altruism (producing children to assist ailing
siblings), and elsewhere to gamete (ova and
sperm) donation as an example where «financial
transactions in the body are [...] transparent»
(2006: 160).
However, by contrast with sperm, eggs these
days fall into one of two types. In the US there is
no legal bar to making payments for ova, argu-
ments often focusing on the appropriate scale of
recompense (Thompson, 2007), insofar, that is,
as the eggs are intended for reproductive purpo-
ses. The situation changes radically when it
comes to those who donate eggs, and in some
cases fertilized eggs (embryos), for research.
There are thus two kinds of ova donors: the one
whose eggs will help another to have a child, and
the one whose eggs may be used for all kinds of
research purposes, known and unknown. In the
distribution of egg and embryonic tissue the
recipient is not a person but a research project.
«The two kinds of donation should be kept separate
even when some eggs are used for IVF [in vitro fertili-
zation] and some for research as part of the very same
act of donation.» (2007: 203)
Although women who become egg donors do
not by that act become mothers themselves, in
the context of fertility treatment they enable
others to be mothers. This is obviously not so
when eggs are destined for research; the gesture
there is towards the ultimately therapeutic inten-
tion of those engaged in research to improve
medicine at large. The donor is a first and fore-
most a «research subject», that is, one who
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contributes part of their bodily self to research,
much as participants in clinical trials do.
Stem-cell research is currently a principal area
in need of eggs, and embryos, which may in turn
be fractionated and multiplied. As Thompson
(2010) observes, once cell lines produced from
reproductive material are in circulation, there is
no way to control their diffusion. This includes
diffusion through commercial ventures. In any
event, she (2007, 2008) cannot see any reason
why women who donate to research programs
should not receive recompense. On the contrary,
much as Goodwin argues, openness would help
protect a system that could well find itself sub-
ject to some of the abuses of organ procurement.
Thompson herself puts forward positive reasons
why payment would assist not just the individual
donor but the whole procurement and potential
treatment system, and how it could be done in
such a way as to avoid direct commercialization
as such. She also deals, one by one, with reasons
against payment. The goals behind each objec-
tion, she argues, could be met by innovations in
practice (which she specifies in detail I do not
give here), and none could not also be met under
a paying regime. To give an anthropological
summary: there are many advantages to recipro-
city being tied to the gift.
Why does Thompson take such care in dealing
with the reasons against payment? These turn
out to be reasons why payment would distort the
nature of the action, substantively why it would
subvert the character of gift-giving. And what
has to be conserved about gift-giving? This turns
out to be a deeply rooted assumption that
«altruism» is bound up with the gift, and is a
principal motive in self / body giving.
Let me expand the point briefly. The ubiqui-
tous vocabulary of donation makes of the body
tissue a «gift of life». It entails, in its canonical
Euro-American form, a notion of the autonomy
of the voluntary act. This is partly what enables a
gift to be a signifier of altruism. The giver legally
bestows possession on another without obliga-
tion, and in that sense without self-interest,
although all kinds of obligations and interests
may accompany gift-giving practices. This kind
of gift is «free» by contrast, above all, with com-
modities that circulate in market transactions,
the type case of immediate reciprocity8. Dona-
tion is often presented as the antonym to com-
merce; indeed, the contrast is a plank in many
donor programs (encouraging donors to give),
and the rhetoric of the altruistic gift has as deep
and widespread an appeal as commerce is regar-
ded as inappropriate for transactions in human
organs. We could almost say there is a taboo on
speaking of the donation of body parts as
though they could be objects of commerce.
«Among the strongest ideological underpin-
nings of transplant medicine is the adamant
denial of body commodification» (Sharp, 2006:
12), and outside the US that applies more widely
than organ transplantation.
The ideology prescribes the type of person
who, for certain purposes at least, is a suitable
donor. In this view, body parts should come from
sources in those who give voluntarily, not just
out of fellow-feeling for others but in the sense
that nothing has been extracted from them
through undue inducement or coercion. Such
attributes would be betrayed if donors sought
recompense. Protocols of anonymity, where they
are in place, uphold the image of the free and
altruistic donor; conversely, at the other extreme,
altruism is held in place by people acting intima-
tely as kin do towards one another ¢ the sister
who donates eggs to a sister or the relative whose
bone marrow can be matched with a patient’s ¢
for kinship can also signal «self-less» intention.
Such ideas belong to a broader nexus of
concerns about the role of money in people’s
sense of themselves. On the one hand is the
assumption that as soon as commerce enters the
room altruism goes out of the window; on the
other hand is the assumption that if reciproca-
tion is monetary then it has an inevitable
commodification-effect9.
Those who now argue for attaching
«exchange» or «reciprocity» to the gift do not
subscribe to these assumptions. The introduction
of reciprocity may appeal to market arguments
for exchange, but it may also visualize non-
market ones. What is interesting about the pro-
posal for recompense, in the accounts both from
Goodwin (posthumous organ transplants) and
Thompson (ova donation for research), is the
way a notion of the gift endures. Introduce
exchange, but attach it to the gift ¢ don’t get rid
of gift as a concept! In asking why not, we might
glimpse something of the interest of Juillerat’s
chapter.
Why not get rid of (the concept of) the gift?
The figure of the altruistic donor, male or female
in respect of organs, female in respect of eggs,
carries with it an ethical aura. Goodwin (2006:
8. For a thorough exploration of the (anthropological and related) mythology here, see Konrad (2005).
9. Yet even if one concurs that donation is the antonym to commerce, one may note that reciprocity in the form of the
obligation to return a gift is itself different from market exchange (commerce). Note that in English «payment» does not
necessarily imply either a monetary or market transaction (one «pays» compensation for instance).
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21) is forthright about conserving altruism: her
hybrid system for organ procurement is one
«that supports altruistic procurement», for it
«would allow for altruism and commoditization
to mutually thrive». After all, in gamete dona-
tion, as we have seen, «[m]arket systems [...]
coexist with altruism» (2006: 182). Thompson
argues that it is the fear of driving out the ethical
impulse of altruism that has prevented recom-
pense in the past and clouded debate. Yet if we
look at reproductive egg donation, she also
posits (2007: 208), we find that the two kinds of
motivation, «far from being incompatible, seem
to bolster one another [...] [So] [i]t is wrong then
to worry that being paid substitutes a financial
for an altruistic motivation». The willing
research subject can still be thought of as
making a donation to science or to society. Ethi-
cal ends can still be met; donations can still be
encouraged «for the right reasons» (2007: 209).
In fact Thompson (2010) has recently put
forward a suggestion for replacing the principle
of altruism (as the donor’s ideal motivation)
with that of care (of the donor’s body and per-
son); what is conserved is the ethical stance.
But ethics for whom? Is it not above all «the
system», that is, the processes of procurement
and distribution, whose practices ¢ for very good
reason ¢ must be kept ethical? Thompson’s
account of the traditional concept of ethics that
required the egg donor, in the context of
research, to receive no return is illuminating
here.
In effect, it is the act of taking that the gift in
this tradition renders ethical: the altruistic donor
elicits ethical consideration from others.
«[P]rotection of potential egg donors has become
the signature of ethical concern in the politics of stem
cell research in California and elsewhere, and has
emerged as the women’s issue.» (Thompson, 2008:
117, original italics)
In other words, protection10 of the (unrecom-
pensed) research subject becomes the sign of
ethical action on behalf of those engaged in the
research, or indeed of those who subsequently
make use of the material. The source is impec-
cable; tissue has been extracted appropriately.
But for the appropriateness to be registered, the
research subject must be seen to be exercising
voluntary will. I quoted the observation that
human donations, of organs and some tissues,
enter the procurement system altruistically and
exit commercially. Precisely: the initial extrac-
tion is appropriately of a gift. But obviously the
gift has this character only at the identifiable
point of extraction from the donor; further down
the chain all kinds of other transactions may
occur between actors in diverse roles. Perhaps we
should not be surprised to find the figure of the
donor sometimes gets rather special treatment.
If there is a specific point at which the Yafar
material enlarges one’s vision, it is here. One
would not wish to stretch vernacular usage too
far: American egg donors are not «mothers» in
the way that Juillerat was able to envisage the
promordial Yafar Mother. Yet there is some-
thing suggestive about the figure of the deity
who pours forth her milk, «fractionated» into
diverse species of game for the hunter. At least in
some parts of United States, ethical tradition
places at the heart of stem cell research an
enchanted female. This anonymous figure is
shrouded in a kind of sanctity, purified of inten-
tions that may be sullied by thought of return11.
She cannot, must not, receive anything back.
Personifying the donation of all kinds of body
parts, then, is the self-less donor to research who
only has the long term need of others in mind.
What is being ritualized here, or in secular terms
enchanted, is an ethical stance towards procure-
ment. In other words this figure sanctifies (ethi-
cises) the transaction, just as the Yafar Mother
bestows bountiful game on men who are then
free to take whatever puts itself in their path.
The North American advocates of recom-
pense would seemingly attach reciprocity to the
gift at the moment when transactions in human
tissue are also required to show their ethical
sourcing; in conserving the idea of gift-giving as
an organizing feature in procurement practices,
they show that ethical action need not be com-
promised.
End
I do not know if there were any people from
Yafar in Madang hospital, Papua New Guinea,
at the time when Street (2009) was making her
study of visualisation practices, but if there were
they no doubt would have been aware of the
extent to which the hospital required blood to do
its work. To obtain blood the hospital runs a
scheme by which patients request their relatives
for donations, even if (because of blood type) it
10. The medical risks of egg extraction are widely known, and there are several areas of concern that Thompson describes.
11. In relation to embryos, Thompson (2009) notes the severity of the isscr (International Society for Stem Cell Research)
sample consent form that specifies that a donor can have no further interest in what has been given, and must understand there
is no way in which any direct financial benefit can come from future commercial developments.
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is not their relatives’ blood that they themselves
receive. The procedures draw, she says:
«on prevalent notions of gift exchange in Papua
New Guinea that consider the recipient as an active
agent in the extraction of gifts from others.» (2007:
195)
From Juillerat’s account, one might imagine
that among the confusions that the hospital set-
ting presented a Yafar patient, this would be
another12! But they would perhaps recognize
what Street also indicates, that blood transfusion
does not seem to entail an ongoing process of
reciprocation:
«it might be thought of as a point of finishing or
completion after which the patient will be able to leave
the hospital, and which contains all previous exchan-
ges and transactions within itself.» (2007: 209)
Like Juillerat, the North American commen-
tators cited here, advocates of reform or not,
hold on to the concept of gifting. It was hoped
that this excursus might reach a point where it
became evident whether or not these diverse
appeals to gift-giving and donation were doing
similar intellectual work, that is, belonged to a
common (Euro-American) paradigm of inter-
pretation and analysis. A partial answer might
be that common ground lies in the manner in
which the assumptions that surround gifting
lend themselves to larger descriptions of social
life than interactions between donors and reci-
pients might imply. The gift is held to have orga-
nizational effects.
And perhaps what teases anthropologists so
about certain acts of gift-giving is the way they
also epitomise how people’s intentions resist
organization. Insofar as the act can indeed be an
intention of a kind (as Jeudy-Ballini and Juille-
rat indicated by their brackets [see above p. 120]),
it is selective and discriminatory: the recipient is
rendered passive. This would resonate with the
emphasis that Juillerat gives to choice and the
implied possibility of refusing to give or recipro-
cate (2007: 159)13. Caprice on the part of the
donor (whether or not to give) contrasts with the
uncertain but at least possible ability to measure
people’s actions through their relations with
others, which is what reciprocated gift exchange
or market exchange both afford. As it is, like
male initiates in other Melanesian situations
concerned as to whether they have demonstrably
grown, the Yafar men who stand under the coco-
nut are in a state of anxiety to whether or not
flowers will fall into their upturned hands. Many,
Juillerat tells us, will fail to receive, will not expe-
rience the Mother’s gift14. Organ and tissue pro-
curement programmes, research bodies and fer-
tility clinics, always chronically short of raw
material, have their hands outstretched too.
What they so avidly desire cannot, they believe,
be taken by coercion.
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